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STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to

admonish the jury not to transfer the guilt of co-defendant and coconspirator Sanchez to Defendant to cure the prosecutor's improper
statements

about the co-defendant's guilty plea during opening

argument and trial and whether such improper statements prejudiced
Defendant's right to a fair trial.

"Generally, the test used for

determining whether a prosecutor's

statements are improper and

constitute error is whether the remarks "^called to the jurors'
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in
reaching a verdict.'" State

v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992)

(quoting State

v. Johnson,

v.

646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982)) {Johnson

Creviston,

other grounds by State
v. Peters,
Gardner,

663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) (quoting

v. Roberts,

overruled on

111 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985));

796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State
789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989), cert,

110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)).

denied,

Archambeau,
2.

Dunn,

v.

494 U.S. 1090,

However, this issue, for the reasons

stated below, presents circumstances constituting plain error.
v.

State

Appointed trial counsel failed to object to

such improper statements.

State

State

850 P.2d

1201, 1208-09

(Utah

1993);

State

See
v.

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant

of communications fraud as a second degree felony.

When reviewing a

claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
6

State

v.

Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992);

968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

(citing State

381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
(quoting State
v. Petree,

v. Booker,

denied,

State

v. Hayes,

v. Lemons,

860 P.2d

844 P.2d 378,

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) quoting

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

State

Reversal is appropriate

"only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted."

State

v.

Burk,

Salas,

839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App.

1992) (quoting State

v.

1991), cert, denied,

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)).

820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah Ct. App.
During closing

arguments, Defendant's appointed trial counsel argued that the
evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction for second degree
communications fraud (See Transcript of Trial, R. 423, lines 4-23).
3.

Whether appointed trial counsel denied Defendant of his

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by
failing (1) to timely object to the information in which Defendant
was charged with eight counts of forgery instead of one, and (2) to
timely object to the conviction of Defendant of both forgery and
communications fraud because communications fraud is a lesser and
included offense of forgery, thereby denying Defendant of his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
showing,
deficient
reasonable

Defendant

must

performance,
professional

show,

first, that

falling below
judgment,
7

To make such a

counsel

an objective

and,

second,

rendered
standard

that

a
of

counsel's

performance was prejudicial.
1988) .
Strickland
(1984).

Bundy v. DeLand,

763 P.2d 803 (Utah

Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact.
v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070

When available, the appellate court defers to the trial

court's findings of fact, but reviews its application of legal
principles to its factual findings for correctness.

State

v. Hay,

859 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

in passim

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

in passim

Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution

in passim

The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of
the instant brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By way of Amended Information filed on August 22, 1996, pursuant
to Order Consolidating Cases For Trial entered that same day,
Defendant was charged with eight counts of forgery, all third degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-501, and one count of
communications fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801, a
second degree felony.

Prior to consolidation, Defendant appeared

with appointed counsel and pleaded not guilty to the aforementioned
charges.

On August 29, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed
8

counsel for jury trial.
as charged.

The jury convicted Defendant on all counts

Defendant appeared with appointed trial counsel on

November 18, 1996, for sentencing, at which time the trial court
sentenced Defendant on the eight counts of forgery to the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years, a $5,000
fine, and an 85% surcharge on each of the eight counts.

As to

communications fraud, the trial court sentenced Defendant to the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years, plus
a $10,000 fine, and an 85% surcharge.

The trial court ordered the

terms to run concurrently and gave credit for time served.

On

November 18, 1996, the trial court signed the Judgment and Commitment
to the Utah State Prison on November 18, 1996, which was entered that
same day.

Defendant, through appointed trial counsel, filed Notice

of Appeal on December 17, 1996.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

By way of Amended Information filed on August 22, 1996,

pursuant to Order Consolidating Cases For Trial entered that same day
(see Order Consolidating Cases For Trial, R. 56),

Defendant was

charged with eight counts of forgery, all third degree felonies, in
violation

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

76-6-501,

and

one

count

of

communications fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-10-1801, a
second degree felony (Amended Information, R. 57-61);
2.

On August 29, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed

counsel for jury trial (Transcript of Trial, R. 227-444);

9

3.

During

opening

statement,

the

prosecutor

stated

the

following:
This case involves a forged check scheme.
You are going to hear testimony from five
witnesses, but one of those witnesses is a young
lady by the name of Susan Sanchez. Now, Susan

Sanchez was a co-defendant
in this
particular
scheme. She has already been convicted by plea
and shefll
testify
to you as to the nature of
that plea and what consideration
she was given
by the State for purposes of her testimony
here
today and you can evaluate her testimony
in
light of that.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 272, lines 12-19) (Emphasis added);
4.

Defendant's appointed trial counsel waived opening argument

(Transcript of Trial, R. 276, line 2);
5.

During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor

called Ms. Susan Sanchez, Defendant's co-defendant, as a witness
(Transcript of Trial, R. 300, lines 16-17) .

In the course of

examining Ms. Sanchez, the following exchange took place:
MR. WILSON:

Now, Susan, itfs

my

recollection

that we charged you in connection
with
matter and that you pled guilty
to two
degree felony counts; is that
correct?

this
third

MS. SANCHEZ: Yes.

MR. WILSON: You also pled guilty to
additional
count or counts in Ogden in Weber County; is
that
correct?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Yes, I did.

MR. WILSON:
So you are currently
serving a
sentence in respect to the forgeries
that are
before this Court for purposes of this
trial?
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes.

10

MR. WILSON: Okay. Were any promises made to
you, Susan, as to other than the agreement that
we would allow you to plead to two counts and
dismiss the other counts or any promises made to
you in connection with your testimony here
today?
MS. SANCHEZ: No.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 75-76) (Emphasis added);
6.

Trial counsel's terse cross-examination of Ms. Sanchez did

not include any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty
plea as a co-defendant on charges in the instant case (see Transcript
of Trial, R. 103-05).

Moreover, appointed trial counsel did not ask

any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty plea even
after the prosecution recalled Ms. Sanchez as a witness (Transcript
of Trial, R. 376-80)/
7.

In the course of closing argument, the prosecutor stated

the following:

J think Susan Sanchez was very believable

in her

testimony.
You can look at her interest in the
results of the trial. What did she have to

gain? She has already been incarcerated
as a
result
of her pleading
guilty
on charges in
connection with these proceedings,
so what what
was there
testimony?

for

her

to

gain

by

giving

her

(Transcript of Trial, R. 417) (Emphasis added.);
8.

In response, Defendant's appointed trial counsel, during

closing argument, stated the following:
Now, let me specifically tell you what her
motive is here to lie. She is either protecting
somebody else or she is going to get a favorable
treatment. I know no promises have been made to
her.
She is in a State Correctional Facility
and she is aiding the State. I submit to you

11

she would not be up there today unless she felt
she was going to get something for it . . . . I
submit she is going to try and get a benefit
from this for favorable treatment.
She has
already got a plea bargain that she pled guilty
to reduced charges. And as I said, I feel that
she would not be here today unless she felt she
was going to get something else.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 423-24);
9.

The trial court did not in any way admonish the jury

against transferring the guilt of co-defendant Sanchez to Defendant;
10.
evidence

In the course of the jury trial, the prosecution presented
of various allegedly

forged checks

in the amount of

$3,665.26;1
11.

Jury Instruction No. 16 states the following:
Before you can convict the defendant,
Albert Ross, of the crime of communications
Fraud, as charged in Count Nine of the

2

The checks introduced and admitted as evidence during the
prosecution's case-in-chief are State's Exhibit No. 1 in the amount
of
$456.00
payable
from American
International
Aerospace
Manufacturing, Inc., to Randi Gonzales and dated November 2, 1995;
State's Exhibit No. 2 in the amount of $473.00 payable from American
International Aerospace Manufacturing, Inc., to Randi Gonzales (dated
November 2, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 3 in the amount of 395.76
payable from Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L. Gonzales
(dated November 6, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 4 in the amount of
38 9.75 payable from Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L.
Gonzales (dated November 6, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 5 in the
amount of $435.00 payable from ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. Gonzales
(dated November 13, 1995; State's Exhibit No. 6 in the amount of
$380.00 payable from ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. Gonzales (dated
November 15, 1995; State's Exhibit No. 7 in the amount of 375.00
payable from Gillies Signs & Design Inc. to Randi L Gonzales (dated
November 17, 1995); State's Exhibit No. 8 in the amount of $369.75
payable from Ogden Blueprint and Supply Co. to Randi Gonzales (dated
November 17, 1995); and State's Exhibit No. 13 in the amount of
$380.00 payable from Gillies Signs & Design Inc. to Randi L Gonzales
(dated November 17, 1995) (See envelope of exhibits, R. 450, and
copies of checks attached hereto as Addenda A ) .
12

Information, you must find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following
elements of the crime:
1.
That during the month of November,
1995, the defendant was in Davis and Weber
Counties, State of Utah,
2.
That during that time, the defendant
developed a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain money from another,
3.
That the means used by the defendant
to obtain the money was false or fraudulent
pretenses,
representations
or
material
omissions,
4.
That during that time the defendant
did communicate directly or indirectly with any
person by any means for the purpose of executing
or concealing the scheme or artifice,

5.
That the value of the property,
money
or thing to be obtained
was in excess
or
$5,000.00,
6.
That the defendant acted intentionally
or knowingly or with reckless disregard for the
truth.
If after careful consideration of all of
the evidence in this case, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every one
of the foregoing elements, then you must find
the defendant, Albert L. Ross, not guilty of
communications Fraud as charged in Count Nine of
the Information. If, on the other hand, after
careful consideration of all the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of
each and every one of the foregoing elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the defendant, Albert L. Ross, guilty of
Communications Fraud as charged in Count Nine of
the Information.
(Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 16, R. 138-39) (Emphasis
added);
12.

Jury Instruction No. 17 states the following:
The statute under which the defendant is
charged in Count Nine provides, in pertinent
part, that a person is guilty of Communications
Fraud if, he has devised any scheme or artifice
to defraud another or to obtain money, property,
or anything or value by means of false or

13

fraudulent pretenses, representation, promises,
or material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing
the scheme or artifice.
The determination of the degree of any
offense for Communications Fraud shall be
measured by the total value of all property,
money or things obtained or sought to be
obtained by the scheme or artifice.

Communications Fraud is a felony of the
second degree when the value of the
property,
money, or thing
obtained
or sought
to be
obtained is or exceeds
$5,000.00.
To communicate means to bestow, convey,
make known, recount, impart, to give by way of
information; to talk over; or to transmit
information. Means of communication include but
are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph,
radio,
television,
newspaper,
computer, and spoken and written communication.
(Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 17, R. 140)

(Emphasis

added);
13.

As part of Defendant's closing argument, appointed trial

counsel argued the following concerning the communications fraud
count:
Now, with the communications fraud counts
[sic], the very last count I'll just touch on
briefly. The specific evidence you have with
regards to this scheme that Susan Sanchez was
involved in are these eight checks. Total them
up. They do not total $5,000. They are under
$5,000. From my position, for that reason alone
the element of having the value of the property
or things to be obtained, they have to show it
was in excess of $5,000. Add those checks up.
They don't add up to $5,000 worth, but you have
no evidence of that today.
You have no
specifics as to what checks she cashed above
those. You don't have the checks in front of
you.
You don't have the amounts on those
checks. You don't know where they were cashed.
You don't know who the bank was that they were
drawn on.
Everything else other than the
14

evidence you have today is speculation with
regards to that count. And for that reason,
alone, I suggest you should find Mr. Ross not
guilty on that communications fraud.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 423, lines 4-23);
14.

The prosecutor, in response, argued the following about the

communications fraud charge:
Now, the defendant also wants you to
believe that because we have only shown on these
eight checks a sum total of some $3,200 that you
can't find him guilty of the communications
fraud. Well, regardless of whether he actually
collected $5,000 from the scheme of not, the
statute doesn't require that. All the statute
shows, or requires is that you show an intent.
Now, if he didn't collect $5,000, why was that?
It was because he got shut down on November the
22nd.
It wasn't because he didn't have the
intent or desire to collect the $5,000, because
they had gone out on multiple occasions and I
think you can find, you can find from the
evidence.
I mean, if you divide the eight
checks, the total of the eight checks, you come
up with an average of $410.63. She said that I
had been out two to three times a week over that
three week span and you got anywhere from and
she said five checks a night, you have got a
total of 30 checks at that rate, that's well in
excess at that average. She said also that some
of the checks were as high as $700, others were
in the $300 range.
So there is more than ample evidence to
show that this defendant intended to collect
more than $5,000 from this scheme or artifice
and, in fact, I would submit to you the evidence
demonstrates that he in fact did based upon what
Susan Sanchez says.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 428-29);
15.

After deliberating, the jury convicted Defendant as charged

(Transcript of Trial, R. 205-06; Verdict, R. 100-02; Minute Entry, R.
180-81) ;
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16.

On November 18, 1996, Defendant appeared with appointed

trial counsel for sentencing, at which time the trial court sentenced
Defendant on the eight counts of forgery to the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate term of zero to five years, a $5,000 fine, and an
85%

surcharge on each of the eight counts

Sentencing, R. 448) .

(See

Transcript of

As to communications fraud, the trial court

sentenced Defendant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of one to fifteen years, plus a $10,000 fine, and an 85%
surcharge (See Transcript of Trial, R. 448) . The trial court ordered
the terms to run concurrently and gave credit for time served
(Transcript of Trial, R. 448);
17.

On November 18, 1996, the trial court signed the Judgment

and Commitment to the Utah State Prison on November 18, 1996, which
was entered that same day (Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State
Prison, R. 199). Defendant, through appointed trial counsel, filed
Notice of Appeal on December 17, 1996 (Notice of Appeal, R. 205) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The

trial court committed plain error by

failing to

admonish the jury after the prosecutor's improper and uninvited
statements about the guilty plea of co-conspirator and co-defendant
Sanchez' to charges arising out of the same circumstances upon which
defendant's charges arose.

By failing to immediately admonish the

jury, the prosecutor called to the jurors' attention matters which
they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict.
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Such an error was harmful because the jury likely transferred the
guilt of Defendant's co-defendant and co-conspirator to Defendant.
As a result, Defendant was denied his constitutional right to a fair
trial.
2.

The evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the

conviction of defendant for communications fraud as a second degree
felony inasmuch as the money obtained or sought to be obtained does
not exceed $5,000 as required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(d).
There is essentially no evidence, whatsoever, establishing that "the
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is or exceeds $5,000."

Further, the State presented no

evidence, other than the speculative and unclear testimony of Ms.
Sanchez, that Defendant sought to obtain property or money in excess
of statutory requirement of $5,000. As evidenced by the prosecutor's
specious

closing

argument

about

how

the

statutory

amount

is

satisfied, the basis for the second degree communications fraud
conviction is premised on sufficiently inconclusive, inherently
improbable, and fatally speculative evidence to the extent that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.
3.

By failing to timely object to the information through

which defendant was charged with eight counts of forgery and by
failing to timely object to defendant's conviction of both forgery
and communications fraud, appointed trial counsel denied defendant of
his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
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Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely object fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of
existing Utah case law and the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 761-402.

But for counsel's deficient performance of failing to object,

the outcome of Defendant case would have been different.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO
ADMONISH THE JURY AFTER THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER AND
UNINVITED STATEMENTS ABOUT CO-CONSPIRATOR AND CODEFENDANT SANCHEZ' GUILTY PLEA TO CHARGES ARISING OUT
OF THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES FROM WHICH DEFENDANT'S
CHARGES AROSE, THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

" [A] prosecutor's reference to the guilty plea of a defendant's
co-conspirator[ ] is plain error and grounds for reversal on appeal,
even absent objection by defense counsel at the time of the improper
comment."
1979)

United

States

(citing United

1977))/ 2 see

also

v. Handly,

States

United

States

v.

591 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir.

Corona,
v.

2

Hansen,

551 F.2d 1386

(5th Cir.

544 F.2d 778

(5th Cir.

The Handly Court noted the following concerning such an improper
reference to a co-conspirator's guilty plea:
We note that a prosecutor's improper
reference to a coconspirator's guilty plea is
very different from the permissible tactic
commonly employed by prosecutor's where the
prior record of a government witness is
introduced in order to take the wind out of the
defendant's
sails
regarding
the witness'
credibility. Introducing evidence of a witness'
prior convictions or guilty pleas, unrelated to
the defendant, is not prejudicial to the
defendant, but reference to the guilty pleas of
that defendant's alleged coconspirators, in the
very case in which the defendant is then
standing trial, is obviously capable of
18

1977) .

"Generally,

the

test

used

for

determining

whether a

prosecutor's statements are improper and constitute error is whether
the remarks "^called to the jurors' attention matters which they
State

would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict.'"
v. Emmett,

839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (quoting State

663 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1983) (quoting State

v.

v.

Creviston,

Johnson,
646 P.2d

750, 754 (Utah 1982)) (Johnson overruled on other grounds by State
Roberts,

711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985)); State

712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State
(Utah 1989), cert,

denied,

v. Peters,

v. Gardner,

v.

796 P.2d 708,

789 P.2d 273, 287

494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990)).

In

other words, the test is whether the prosecutor's statements, taken
as a whole in the context of the entire case, prejudicially affected
substantial rights of the defendant.
States,

See generally

Berger

v.

United

295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935).
The issue concerning the prosecutor's improper remarks about the

guilty plea of Defendant's alleged co-conspirator in the instant
appeal is raised for the first time on appeal.

Ordinarily, the

failure to raise a timely objection to the prosecutor's remarks
constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal unless
constitute plain error.

Emmett,

the remarks

839 P.2d at 785.

prejudicing his trial.
United States
v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125, 1128 n.l (5th Cir. 1979)
(emphasis included).
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In State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme

Court outlined the following principles involved in determining
whether "plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of plain
error and to obtain appellate relief from an
alleged error that was not properly objected to,
the appellant must show the following: (i) An
error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome
for
the
appellant,
or
phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see also

Ct. App. 1996); and State
1996) .

State

v. Portillo,

v. Tenney,

According to State

v.

914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah

913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App.

Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah

1989), "in most circumstances, the term ^manifest injustice' [found
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the ^plain error'
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d). . . ."
The trial court committed plain error throughout almost every
phase of the trial by failing to immediately admonish the jurors that
they were not to transfer the guilt of Defendant's co-defendant and
co-conspirator to Defendant to correct, if possible, the prosecutor' s
remarks that called to the jurors' attention the co-conspirator's
guilty plea.3 Under the circumstances of the instant case, the jurors
would not be justified in considering the co-defendant and coconspirator guilty plea in reaching the verdict.
3

Throughout the

In addition, the prosecutor's comments during closing argument
arguably constitute prosecutorial misconduct (See footnote 11 and
accompanying text in Argument II below).
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proceedings

the prosecutor

referred

defendant Sanchez' guilty plea.

to co-conspirator

and co-

During the opening statement, the

prosecutor made the following remarks:
This case involves a forged check scheme.
You are going to hear testimony from five
witnesses, but one of those witnesses is a young
lady by the name of Susan Sanchez. Now, Susan

Sanchez was a co-defendant
in this
particular
scheme. She has already been convicted by plea
and she'll
testify
to you as to the nature of
that plea and what consideration
she was given
by the State for purposes of her testimony
here
today and you can evaluate her testimony
in
light of that.
(Transcript

of

Trial, R.

Defendant's

appointed

272, lines

trial

counsel

12-19)

(Emphasis

waived

opening

added).
argument

(Transcript of Trial, R. 276, line 2).
During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor called
Ms. Susan Sanchez, Defendant's co-defendant, as a witness (Transcript
of Trial, R. 300, lines 16-17) .

In the course of examining Ms.

Sanchez, the following exchange took place:
MR. WILSON:

Now, Susan, itfs

my

recollection

that we charged you in connection
with
matter and that you pled guilty
to two
degree felony counts; is that
correct?

this
third

MS. SANCHEZ: Yes.

MR. WILSON: You also pled guilty to
additional
count or counts in Ogden in Weber County; is
that
correct?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Yes, I did.

MR. WILSON:
So you are currently
serving a
sentence in respect to the forgeries
that are
before this Court for purposes of this
trial?
21

MS. SANCHEZ:

Yes.

MR. WILSON: Okay. Were any promises made to
you, Susan, as to other than the agreement that
we would allow you to plead to two counts and
dismiss the other counts or any promises made to
you in connection with your testimony here
today?
MS. SANCHEZ: No.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 75-76) (Emphasis added).4

Then, in the

course of closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following:

J think Susan Sanchez was very believable

in her

testimony.
You can look at her interest in the
results of the trial. What did she have to

gain? She has already been incarcerated
as a
result
of her pleading
guilty
on charges
in
connection with these proceedings,
so what what
was there
testimony?

for

her

to

gain

by

giving

her

(Transcript of Trial, R. 417) (Emphasis added.).
The prosecutor's remarks and statements about Sanchez' guilty
plea throughout the course of the trial clearly urged the jury to
consider, without instruction, the guilty plea of a co-defendant and
co-conspirator, thereby transferring the guilt of the co-defendant
and co-conspirator to Defendant.

The consideration by the jury of

Sanchez' guilty plea as substantive evidence of Defendant's guilt is
a matter that the jury was not justified in considering in reaching

Appointed trial counsel's cross-examination of Ms. Sanchez did
not include any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her guilty
plea (See Transcript of Trial, R. 103-05) . Moreover, appointed trial
counsel did not ask any questions of Ms. Sanchez with respect to her
guilty plea even after the prosecution recalled Ms. Sanchez as a
witness (Transcript of Trial, R. 376-80).
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the verdict.5

In light of well-settled principles of law involving

the constitutional right to a fair trial6 and the presumption of
innocence

in

criminal

trials7 and

the

blatant

nature

of

the

prosecutor's remarks,8 it should have been obvious to the trial court

5

In United States
v. Hansen, 544 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1977), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted the
following:
[T]here is no need to advise the jury or its
prospective members that some one not in court,
not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded
guilty. The prejudice to the remaining parties
who are charged with complicity in the acts of
the
self-confessed
guilty participant
is
obvious.
Id. at 780 (Emphasis added.).
6

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ."
7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1)
criminal proceeding is presumed to
the offense charged against him is
In the absence of such proof, the

provides that "[a] defendant in a
be innocent until each element of
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
defendant shall be acquitted."

8

In State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme
Court, in the course of discussing the duty of prosecutors to eschew
all improper tactics, noted the following:
[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul one. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as
it is to use every legitimate means to bring
23

that the prosecutor's statements called to the jurors' attention
matters they were not justified in considering.
With respect to whether the error was harmful, it should be
noted that the evidence against Defendant in the instant case is not
compelling.

Almost the entire case presented against Defendant was

built on the self-serving testimony of Sanchez, Defendant's codefendant and alleged co-conspirator.

To suggest to the jury that

the guilt of a co-defendant and co-conspirator be transferred to
Defendant is to introduce a powerful and inappropriate factor into
Cf.

the jury's deliberative process.

Emmett,

839 P.2d at 786.

In

cases such as the one at bar, the substantive use of a co-defendant's
and co-conspirator's guilty plea can tilt the balance in favor of
conviction.

Id.

Such is the case here.

Consequently, there is a

reasonable likelihood that absent the error a different result would
have occurred.

II.

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
THE CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT FOR COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
AS A SECOND DEGREE FELONY INASMUCH AS THE MONEY
OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE OBTAINED DOES NOT EXCEED
$5,000 AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-101801(1) (d) .

When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.

State

v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992);

Id. at 787 (quoting State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 557 (Utah 1987)
(citing Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633
(1935) ) .
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State

v. Hayes,

v. Lemons,

860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,

P.2d 948 (Utah 1993) (quoting State
(Utah 1985) (quoting State

v. Petree,

v.

Booker,

(citing

State

denied,

857

709 P.2d 342, 345

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate "only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."

State

(quoting State
cert,

denied,

v. Burk,

v. Salas,

839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993)).

The foregoing standard applies even where much of the evidence
is circumstantial.

State v. Barlow,

App. 1993) (citing State
State

v. Nickles,

v. Span,

851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah Ct.

819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) and

728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah 1986)).

As a matter of

well-settled law, "circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused."

See Nickles,

728 P.2d at 126.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict "if it is of Asuch
quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.'" Span,
P.2d at 127) .

819 P.2d at 332 (quoting Nickles,

728

However, the following standard applies when the

evidence consists solely of undisputed, circumstantial evidence:
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to
determine (1) whether there is any evidence that
supports each and every element of the crime
charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can
be drawn from that evidence have a basis in
25

logic and reasonable human experience sufficient
to prove each legal element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is
not legally valid if it is based solely on
inferences that give rise to only remote or
speculative possibilities of guilt.
State

v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
Furthermore, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,

a "Md]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light
most
Hayes,

favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient.'"
860 P.2d at 972 (quoting State

(Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,

denied,

v.

Vigil,

840 P.2d 788, 793

857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)).

In

the instant case, Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in
support of the verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and
then persuade the appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the
State failed to prove that he was a was guilty of second degree
communications fraud.

See State

v. Scheel,

823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah

Ct. App. 1991).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(c) provides that anyone guilty of
communications fraud is guilty of "a third degree felony when the
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sough to be
obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000. . . ."
Subsection (1)(d), in contrast, provides for a communications fraud
penalty of "a second degree felony when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds
$5,000. . . ."
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To convict Defendant of communications fraud as a second degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1) (d) , the State had

to

prove that "the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000.

. . ."

The State, as

required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501, 9 had the burden to prove each
of the aforementioned elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence supporting the second degree communications fraud
conviction consists of the following:
prosecutor

during

the

prosecution's

(1) Evidence presented by the
case-in-chief

allegedly forged checks that total $3,665.26; 10 and

9

of

various

(2) Testimony of

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "elements
of the offense" mean:
(a)
The
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense; or
(b)
The
culpable
mental
state
required.

The checks introduced and admitted as evidence during the
prosecutor's case-in-chief are State's Exhibit No. 1 in the amount of
$456.00 payable from American International Aerospace Manufacturing,
Inc., to Randi Gonzales (dated November 2, 1995) (Transcript of
Trial, R. 291-93; R. 4 5 0 ) ; State's Exhibit No. 2 in the amount of
$473.00 payable from American International Aerospace Manufacturing,
Inc., to Randi Gonzales (dated November 2, 1995) (Transcript of
Trial, R. 279-80; R. 4 5 0 ) ; State's Exhibit No. 3 in the amount of
395.7 6 payable from Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L.
Gonzales (dated November 6, 1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 280-81; R.
4 5 0 ) ; State's Exhibit No. 4 in the amount of 389.75 payable from
Technicare Automotive Service to Randi L. Gonzales (dated November 6,
1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 281-82; R. 4 5 0 ) ; State's Exhibit No.

27

co-defendant, Sanchez, that was elicited by the prosecutor in the
course of the following direct examination:
MR. WILSON: Okay. Now you indicated that on
that first occasion you probably cashed three or
four checks, is that correct?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Uh-huh. Yes.

MR. WILSON: Did you have occasion to go out at
any other time and cash checks during the month
of November?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Yeah.

MR. WILSON: Can you remember approximately how
many times you went out and cashed checks?
MS. SANCHEZ: It had to have been about two or
three time a week.
MR. WILSON:
Okay.
And on each of those
occasions, do you remember how many checks you
would cash on each occasion, the approximate
number?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Five.

MR. WILSON:
Five?
Okay.
Did this check
cashing go on in Weber County and Davis County?
MS. SANCHEZ:

Yeah.

5 in the amount of $435.00 payable from ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L.
Gonzales (dated November 13, 1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 293-95/
R. 450)/ State's Exhibit No. 6 in the amount of $380.00 payable from
ArcticTemp, Inc., to Randi L. Gonzales (dated November 15, 1995)
(Transcript of Trial, R. 295/ R. 450)/ State's Exhibit No. 7 in the
amount of 375.00 payable from Gillies Signs & Design Inc. to Randi L
Gonzales (dated November 17, 1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 282-83/
R. 450)/ State's Exhibit No. 8 in the amount of $369.75 payable from
Ogden Blueprint and Supply Co. to Randi Gonzales (dated November 17,
1995) (Transcript of Trial, R. 295-96/ R. 450)/ and State's Exhibit
No. 13 in the amount of $380.00 payable from Gillies Signs & Design
Inc. to Randi L Gonzales (dated November 17, 1995) (Transcript of
Trial, R. 340-41/ R. 450) (See envelope of exhibits, R. 450, and
copies of checks attached hereto as Addenda A/ see also testimony of
Susan Sanchez, Transcript of Trial, R. 314-18).
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MR. WILSON: Okay. Can you tell us what cities
that you recall you cashed checks in?
MS. SANCHEZ:
Ogden.

It was Ogden, Roy and out at South

MR. WILSON: Okay. Did you cash any in Davis
County, any cities in Davis County that you
recall?
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes.
MR. WILSON:
[sic]?
MS. SANCHEZ:
•

*

*

Do you remember what cities it was
I don't.

•

MR. WILSON:
Okay.
Can you tell us the
approximate amount that these checks would be
made out for?
MS. SANCHEZ: Some had been made out for $700,
some would be made out for $300.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 312-14).
The prosecutor, in response to defense counsel's argument about
the insufficiency of evidence for a second degree communications
fraud conviction, argued the following about the communications fraud
charge:
Now, the defendant also wants you to
believe that because we have only shown on these
eight checks a sum total of some $3,200 that you
can't find him guilty of the communications
fraud. Well, regardless of whether he actually
collected $5,000 from the scheme of not, the
statute doesn't require that. All the statute
shows, or requires is that you show an intent.
Now, if he didn't collect $5,000, why was that?
It was because he got shut down on November the
22nd.
It wasn't because he didn't have the
intent or desire to collect the $5,000, because
they had gone out on multiple occasions and I
think you can find, you can find from the
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evidence.
I mean, if you divide the eight
checks, the total of the eight checks, you come
up with an average of $410.63. She said that I
had been out two to three times a week over that
three week span and you got anywhere from and
she said five checks a night, you have got a
total of 30 checks at that rate, that's well in
excess at that average. She said also that some
of the checks were as high as $700, others were
in the $300 range.
So there is more than ample evidence to
show that this defendant intended to collect
more than $5,000 from this scheme or artifice
and, in fact, I would submit to you the evidence
demonstrates that he in fact did based upon what
Susan Sanchez says.
(Transcript of Trial, R. 428-29).n
In

the

instant

case,

there

is

essentially

no

evidence,

whatsoever, establishing that "the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000."12
Further, the State presented no evidence, other than the speculative
and unclear testimony of Ms. Sanchez, that Defendant sought to obtain
property or money in excess of statutory requirement of $5,000.

In
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The prosecutor's comments, for the reasons set forth below,
arguably constitute prosecutorial misconduct inasmuch as they are
based on the testimony by Ms. Sanchez that the check cashing took
place in both Weber County and Davis County, not to mention that the
prosecution failed to produce any checks to support its theory of how
the second degree statutory amount is met. See State v. Troy, 688
P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984) (holding that comment by a prosecutor
during closing argument that the jury consider matters outside the
evidence is prosecutorial misconduct); see also State v. Palmer, 860
P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Thus, even if the misstatements
were not ^obvious,' we would w'dispense with the obviousness
requirement so that justice can be done.'") (quoting State
v.
Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989)).
"Especially troubling, is the total lack of physical evidence
of the checks that the prosecutor argued make up the difference to
establish the amount in excess of $5,000 for a second degree
communications fraud conviction.
30

fact, Ms. Sanchez, as the State's own witness, incontrovertibly
testified that the check cashing occurred in both Weber County and
Davis County (see Transcript of Trial, R. 313, lines 13-14), which,
in and of itself, raises jurisdictional questions for purposes of the
statutory requirement for the second degree communications fraud
conviction.

As evidenced by the prosecutor's specious closing

argument about how the statutory amount is satisfied, the basis for
the second degree communications fraud conviction is premised on
sufficiently

inconclusive,

inherently

improbable,

and

fatally

speculative evidence to the extent that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted.

"Criminal convictions cannot rest on

conjecture or supposition; they must be established by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt."

See Workman, 852 P.2d at 987 (noting that the

State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred
constitutional safeguards at its core").

Consequently, the State

failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is
required to do.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.

This follows even

when the evidence supporting the second degree communications fraud
conviction is viewed is a light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

III. BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE INFORMATION THROUGH
WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH EIGHT COUNTS OF
FORGERY AND BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION OF BOTH FORGERY AND COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD,
APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED DEFENDANT OF HIS SIXTH
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AMENDMENT
COUNSEL.
In Strickland

RIGHT

TO

THE

v. Washington,

EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE

OF

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984),

the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test for
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment13 right to effective
assistance of counsel has been denied.
1064.

Id.

at 687, 104 S.Ct. at

Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To prevail, a

defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below
an objective

standard of reasonable professional

judgment and,
Bundy

second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
v.

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord

805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State
(Utah 1986); State
State

v. Wright,

v.

Perry,

v.

Frame,

State

v.

Templin,

723 P.2d 401, 405

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995)

893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah App. 1995).

"[T]he right

to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused
to receive a fair trial.'' Lockhart

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364,

,

113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"^identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,
*show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

13

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
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of reasonableness.'" Templin,

805 P.2d at 186 (quoting

Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).
A defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
denied,

State

v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989),

cert,

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different.7' Strickland,
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

805 P.2d at 187.

4 66 U.S.

"A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
Strickland,

the outcome."
Parsons
405.

v. Barnes,

466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069;

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994); Frame,

723 P.2d at

In the process of arriving at this determination, the appellate

court "should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into
account

such

factors as whether

the errors affect

the entire

evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the
verdict is supported by the record."
A.

Templin,

805 P.2d at 187.

CONSOLIDATION OF FORGERY COUNTS
In the instant case, appointed trial counsel's failure to timely

object to the Amended Information in which Defendant was charged with
eight

counts

of

forgery

fell below

an objective

standard

of

reasonable professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law
and the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1).
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Section 76-

1-402 states that "when the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision."
In State v.

Kimbel

620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980), the Utah

Supreme Court held that "embezzlement over a period of time may be
found to constitute one continuous transaction" and therefore one
offense.

The court further stated:
[T]he general test as to whether there are
separate offenses or one offense is whether the
evidence discloses one general intent or
discloses separate and distinct intents. The
particular facts and circumstances of each case
determine this question. If there is but one
intention, one general impulse, and one plan,
even though there is a series of transactions,
there is but one offense.

Id.
also

(quoting People
State

v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)); see

v. Patterson,

700 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985) (holding that acts

of embezzlement over two-month span charged as single offense).
The evidence in the instant case demonstrates that although the
transactions underlying Defendant's forgery convictions occurred over
a three week period of time, they were part of a single plan14 that
happened in the same manner or operation and should have been charged
as one offense (See Transcript of Trial, R.
Crosby,

927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996).

14

309-14).

Cf.

State

v.

In fact, except for minor

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 provides that "^single criminal
episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective."
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differences as to the amounts and accounts of the checks, the Amended
Information charging Defendant and the instructions given to the jury
make no essential distinction between the eight counts (See Amended
Information, R. 57-61; Jury Instructions, R. 128-35) .

But for

counsel's deficient performance of failing to object to the Amended
Information, the eight counts of forgery would have been consolidated
into one count.
B.

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
Appointed trial counsel's additional failure to timely object to

Defendant being convicted of both forgery and communications fraud
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
in light of existing Utah case law and the plain language of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3).

According to § 76-1-402(3), in relevant

part, "[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged
and the included offense. An offense is so included when . . . [i]t
is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged. . . . "15
In other words, the two crimes must be "*such that the greater cannot
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser.'"

15

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution also prohibit the
imposition of separate sentences for lesser included offenses.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that no
person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense" while
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."
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State

v. Hill,

674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State

671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983)).

In Hill,

v.

Baker,

the Utah Supreme Court held

that whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another
offense is determined "by comparing the statutory elements of the two
crimes as a theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to
the facts proved at trial." Id.;
1234, 1236 (Utah 1990); State

see also

v. Branch,

State

v. McCovey,

803 P.2d

743 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah

1987) .
The elements of forgery are set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6501(1)(a) and (b), which states:
A person is guilty of forgery if, with
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without
his authority or utters any such altered
writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes,
authenticates,
issues,
transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that
the writing or the making, completion,
execution,
authentication,
issuance,
transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether
the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time or
place or in a numbered sequence other than
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
In comparison, the elements of communications fraud are set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), which states:
Any person who has devised any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or obtain from
another money, property, or anything of value by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations,
promises,
or
material
omissions, and who communicates directly or
36

indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice is guilty of . . • .
(c) a third degree felony when the value
of the property, money, or thing obtained
or sought to be obtained is or exceeds
$1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value
of the property, money, or thing obtained
or sought to be obtained is or exceeds
$5,000 . . . .
Subsection
bestow,

(6) further provides that

convey,

make

known,

>x

[t]o communicate . . . means to

recount,

impart;

to

give

by

way

of

information; to talk over; or to transmit information" and "[m]eans
of communication
telephone,

include but are not limited to use of the mail,

telegraph,

radio, television, newspaper,

computer,

and

spoke and written communication."
A comparison of the elements, as set forth above, indicates that
communications fraud is established by proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to establish the commission of forgery.

Based

on this comparison, forgery cannot be committed without necessarily
having committed communications fraud and thus communications fraud
Cf.

is a lesser and included offense of forgery.
752 P.2d 874, 878
Appointed

State

v.

Bradley,

(Utah 1988).

trial

counsel's

failure

to

timely

conviction of both forgery and communications

object

to

the

fraud fell below an

objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of
existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-14 0 2 ( 3 ) , and the aforementioned Utah case law previously set forth.
But

for

counsel's

deficient

performance
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of

failing

to

object,

Defendant would not have been convicted of both forgery and the
lesser and included offense of communications fraud.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court

reverse

Defendant's

convictions

and

remand

for

further

proceedings consistent with this Court's directions as stated in its
opinion.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and
novel

issues

in the instant appeal dealing with prosecutorial

misconduct, insufficiency of evidence for a conviction of second
degree communications fraud, and double jeopardy, which are matters
of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and
public.

Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of

disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value
and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fflh d a Y of June, 1997.
XARNbLD & WIGGINS, L.C.

Attorneys ^"ror Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing.BRIEF OF
APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following, on this lffih day of
June, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHRISTINE

SOLTIS

CRIMINAL APPEALS DIVISION
P.O. Box 14-6£54
Salt Laker CityXUT 84114-0854

39

ADDENDUM
Addenda A:

Copies of Checks (Trial Exhibits)

Addenda B:

Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison

40

ADDENDA A

AMERICAN
:
' INTERNATIONAL

Bank One, Utah, N.A.
Fort Union Office (33)
1082 E Fort Union Blvd
Midvale Utah 84047
- 97-154/1240-

f i s ^ ^ ' ^ ™ Aerospace Manufacturing, Inc.
^ 6973 South 300 West
E & . Midvale, Utah 84047.1050
691
CO

>

PAY

REffiMBWKER
Four Hundred-Sixty Seven Dollars-™003Ci:

Co
X
I—I

O

2133

r* -

Dd

Cd
M
•-3

CHECK NO

HOLDER
"? OF

"•oooaiaiH' »:i2wooisi«5»:

A

AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL
Aerospace Manufacturing,

6973 South 300 West
Mjdvale, Utah 84047-1050'
691

PAY

/ i n
{ 'U
v^

TT*
I
I

> Bank One, Jteh, N j l r ^
JLprt Union Office (33)
-**H082 E. Fort Union Blvd.
;dvale, Utah 84047
97-154/1240

In Ic&oo

Four Hundred Seventy Three Dollars

N2

2123

2123
AMOUNT

00 Cents

$473,00

DATE

11/2/95

TO THE

ORDER

L_

o

Randi

Gonzales

H'ooo a i i an" »: i a u oo i s u 5«:

R HUUliU

in'

,' , 00000l1?300•' ,

aat*»S"JK^:«i

TECHNICARE AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE

0293/1

JK

2564

V

6000 SOUTH 300 WEST 288-1988
MURRAY. UT 84107

TPOATHE-V^
ORDER t f t _

, ? , RANDI L . GONZALES
x

97-7751/3243
1

^

2

91VWED

''

gTHRRK HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE DOLLARS 7 6 / 1 0 0 * * * '
-

AMERICA FIRST
CREDIT UNION

•[?• -if P.O. Bpx 9199 • Ogden, UT 84409

$

395.76

^DOLLARS

30 HOT BEOEPOSIl
<LJ^-IAJXJ&£JL^

"•DO E 5&U""

•:32i < 3??51E,i:?Ug,0070U&7 t : l

O"'

,

•,' , OOOOaaiS?&/

'£7

^ 7

/

TECHNICARE AUTOMOTIVE-SERVICE
SOUTH 300
6000 SOUTH
300 WEST 288-1988
MURRAY. UT 84107

-/

02-93

WMENT STOPPED

19 95

11-6

RAND1 L. GONZALES

GO

>

LIHREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE DOLLAR^

W
GO
W
X
33
hH
H

AMERICA FIRST
CREDIT UNION
4

P.O. Box 9199 • Ogden. UT 84409

(<
ii" 0 0 E 5 & & "*
**£*«* vx\'

o

$

f%(\ " ^
V ^ '-:i '1

?

97 7751/3243
1

3 8 9 . 7r)
D OLl AH S

*

*

V ^W

".

-?

/U £" •

H3 E i t 3 ? 7 5 l & i : 7 U E > 0 0 7 0 i « E i 7 q
c^Bm'irc.aiR.m -

0«* ^

/OOOOO 38 S 7 5 /

V

7J 8

r i

?-ifc

i^v)~ '

W
6 'I V

C 7- ^ ^ U

/

ic\
in

O

STATE f S EXHIBIT NO,

^

uxi^L^t-^mo^
Arcticfemp.'lnc
1781 WEST 2800 SOUTH
OGDEN. UTAH 84401
627-0630

S.^'
/ f

. lh
I I

PAY
HRS

DATE

vTO THE ORDER OF

:

97-i0/i;j.i;i

1 - 1 5H9 5v- - R ^ n d i ' G o n z a l e s

1589
^SSJ&^£Lfc^£
~W~?^

CO

>

R A N K Of : j l AM
I ^ T ' ' - r
,'60S W ASM i NG ! O N BL VD O G D I . N U T A H
fe^.U
„

^ V >
CO

"•00 1 5 8 S " '

w

<: i eu 300 i o ? i :

o 1,0a

/OOOOO 38000/

7?UP,H-

X

l-H
•-3

o
c^

A

3
Or

^' *>

LU
CC
UL

° -r >"
UJ ^

v ^V

5

o2

o t-D t °r O <*)
cc

C

u.:oo

tu
o CL°
I
h-

^'LU

o °

LU

O

O
^ °
H < CC

c
r'

>

(3D O

2

"

• r.v i

< o

°<

UJ

X

J> hbl~

£o0)O

2:0:

I 1

•: •;:; ( \ 0 O I 2 /.. J T O

GO

>

10123

V^-GILLIES• V & DESIGN INC.

W

V V

1760 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104
(801) 973-4330

A.
/ \ i¥[/"S"
^
\

I

URFTY BANK of UTAH, N.A.
f h f ^ T ^ECUR
1710 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84104
31-1/1240

GO
W
X
PC
M

PAY

oa

DATE

M

o

CD

Three Hundred Seventy Five Dollars and 00/100

11-17-95
TO THE
ORDER
OF

Ran>

Go

rt»D>0.l l*v

AMOUNT

CO

$375.00O
7S.

REFER TO MAKER^

M l B^DODO> 2I:D..?5 ODD ?V 3B«*

FDOODD37^00/

Xtt> M O T W R r a ^ V ^ t J U S a ^ r f t N N M Q W v ;

J

! s. -J

0

;

i

T H I S Llr

Li

^ • • » : :

•i

=4=IV

those
/'fie y&curity features listed { q&b,astnp*f$
not lifted, exceed industry i ' 'fjf/nes. " *•;•.
Security Fcatqcgs:
|| MicroPriiV; Girjnatfyre Line
Cher• iicc •. i P rotation
ii Eras'jn:.- r'lonx-tiOM
| Security 'Screen

Results of cftajtfftient fv/jifhtion: ;
;
• Small typOrrtgijanatiiffiJijio appeai s ji
as dotted iine^when r&ojocopied
!•
• Stains or spots appdVvath .
!,
chornical alteration
|
• White- mark appears WLIOM erased •':
• Absence ol "Original D o c u m e ^ t " ^ (I
verbiage on-back of check
" ^c;,i!

• " T E " D ¥ R A L " R E S E R V E B O A R D OF G O V E R N O R S R E G . c c

STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 8

fur ±»
i

&}XI(rtZ4

,

«^^4^K^..*

~~

GILLIES—s
1

10102 '

NRST SECURITY BANK of UTAH, U.k.
1710 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84104

1 C T f C S M F C ! 1760 SOUTH REDWOOD N6AD
• • % • • •
B 1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104
I ^ & DESIGN t r K . ^ g J (8oi)973-4330

31-1/1240

Three Hundred E i g h t y D b i l a r s and 00/100
DATE

1

TO THE

I

ORDER

OF

AMOUNT

11-17-95
_

, .

,.

^

$380.00

.

Randi L Gonzales
y

)

/?

*~^

- ^ ^ ~ * Z _ ~ ^J^sJiLu-^^
H-oiOioaii1 i: i ^Odbo i2ijo? 5 oc
DO 21. 3B" 1
v_:

U)

-

-

-

••••

•

.,

. . y

ADDENDA B

CitTOlMftlFRK'S flf^C
,AVIC

r>

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATEJDF .UTAH
pu inr
FAPMTNr,TnNT
n
P
P
A
R
T
M
P
N
T
N
O
V
10
L
51
iFl JO
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Br
^
JUDGMENT AND COMMrTMJCNT
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON

ALBERT ROSS,
Defendant.
Case No. 961700418

That whereas said defendant, having plead guilty to the crimes of forgery, third degree
felonies (8 counts) and communications fraud, a felony of the second degree (one count), and
now being present in Court accompanied by his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon
the Court renders its judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
On the 8 counts of forgery, the defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years and fined $5,000 plus 85% surcharge. On the charge of
communication fraud, the defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of 1 to 15 years and fined $10,000 plus 85% surcharge. The Board of Pardons will
determine the amount of fines to be paid by the defendant.
Court recommendations: These sentences are to be served concurrently. The Court
would recommend the defendant be given credit for time served of 55 days.
Dated November 18, 1996, with the Seal of the Court affixed hereto.

BY THE COURT:

J^tftf. S£c\
f&S
*27

\

t<X
\ ° % PAULA CARR
'.<?v
\ c . % Clerk of Court

\
V

District Court Judge

*
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??\<$r**'
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By -^jUJl^
Kathy PowelU
Deputy Clerk
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